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‘It’s all a question of business’: investment identities, networks and decision-
making in the cleantech economy. 
 
Abstract 
Cleantech has emerged in the last decade as a major new investment area at the very 
cutting edge of the green economy, responding to the need for innovative new technologies 
to combat the impact of global environmental, climate and resource trends. Previous 
research has defined the discursive logics of cleantech and tracked its conceptual, sectoral 
and material development. This paper explores the central importance of social relations 
within the financial domain of the green economy by furthering our understanding of 
cleantech within economic geography, engaging with a broad representation of cleantech 
professionals to explore its nature, operational drivers and definitions, and how these 
interact within socio-spatial network forms of organisation. The central aim of this paper is 
to deepen understandings of the operation of cleantech investment by examining the 
decision-making processes of cleantech actors, how these are influenced by (and influence) 
cleantech investment networks, and the relationships between these factors and the 
macro-level drivers and discourses around the cleantech sector.  More specifically, a 
relational economic geography approach is used in conjunction with other frameworks 
(spanning the cultural, structural and actor-network dimensions of cleantech investment) 
to investigate: how actors within cleantech investment define the sector; the macro- and 
micro-levels drivers of cleantech investment activities; and how cleantech networks form 
and operate to create and disseminate cleantech discourses and to generate the mutual 
trust and information sharing needed to secure cleantech investments.  In so doing, the 
paper seeks to help shed greater lighter on the micro-level processes contributing to the 
creation and growth of cleantech investment markets as an essential catalyst and 
component of the green economy. Fourteen semi-structured interviews were conducted 
with a range of cleantech professionals in London. The paper discusses these cleantech 
actors, their decision-making, how they interact in social network forms of association and 
the vital importance to actors of understanding these networks, aligning these discussions 
to further our understanding of cleantech’s emergence and growth through its 
geographies, discourses and social network interactions. 
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‘It’s all a question of business’: investment identities, networks and decision-
making in the cleantech economy. 
 
Introduction 
Irrespective of whatever other political, social and economic reforms the green economy 
produces in the coming years, there is little doubt that investment (both public and 
private) will play a crucial role in driving forward new technologies and processes aimed at 
improving resource efficiency while reducing social and environmental externalities.  In 
particular, private-sector investment in the emergent cleantech sector stands to make a 
significant contribution to shaping the goals and practices of the green economy.  
Cleantech only really emerged as an identifiable investment target around the year 2000 
but since then the sector has experienced rapid and sustained growth, in overall terms and 
relative to other investment sectors. Like most other investment sectors, cleantech was 
affected by the 2008-2009 financial crisis and subsequent recessionary pressures. 
However, it has responded better than most, with a fall in investment of just 6.6%, 
compared to 19% for the oil and gas industry. Furthermore, the first half of 2011 saw the 
largest half-year investment record since 2000, with over US $4.7 billion invested in the 
sector (Knowles et al. 2012).  However, cleantech is more than simply a burgeoning 
investment sector. Indeed, a Merrill Lynch report describes it as the sixth technological 
revolution, arguing that ‘[t]he current information technology age should give way to the 
leadership of cleantech as the energy infrastructure moves back to renewables’, and that 
venture capital and private equity provide key sources of investment for innovative and 
disruptive technologies that will drive this revolution (Milunovich and Rasco 2008, p. 1). 
 
The geographies of cleantech finance have been the subject of increasing interest among 
economic geographers in recent years, not least because private investment is now the 
largest source of capital for cleantech sub-sectors such as renewable energy (Wüstenhagen 
and Menichetti 2012).  However, although the macro-level trends related to environmental 
change, resource efficiency and profitability driving investor, corporate and government 
interest in cleantech activities are readily identifiable, the details of how cleantech has 
formed and maintained its identity as an investment sector or theme, the rationalities 
underpinning decisions made by participants in cleantech activities, and the ways in which 
cleantech networks and interactions operate remain less well understood.   
 
  
Traditional economic geography approaches have already provided many useful insights 
into the effects and material flows of cleantech investment (Mason and Harrison 2002; 
Montgomery 2006; Knight 2012).  However, some scholars have argued that these 
approaches are less suited to understanding how cleantech professionals construct the 
logics, discourses and processes that influence the identity, scope, orientations and 
everyday workings of cleantech investment (Caprotti 2012a). In contrast, studies rooted in 
relational economic geography, cultural economy and related approaches that focus on the 
importance of social relations and networks in shaping economic interactions appear more 
suited to probing the inner workings of markets, especially when compared with the more 
abstract lenses of classical economics or analyses of macro trends that struggle to explain 
how markets are made, operate and change (Boeckler and Berndt 2012).  As Leyshon 
(1998) notes, financial and commodity markets are palpable entities producing concrete 
effects but many fundamentals of their character and operations are socially constructed 
by myriad actors, technologies and institutions which are involved in financial and 
commodity networks.  Leyshon argues that such networks and shared meanings are crucial 
for generating the trust needed for exchanges between buyers and sellers to take place.  
Similarly, Berndt and Boeckler (2009, p. 536) argue that: ‘Markets do not simply fall out of 
thin air, but are continually produced and constructed socially with the help of actors who 
are interlinked in dense and extensive webs of social relations, [...] concrete markets 
cannot be separated from their social and institutional context.’   
 
Much of the recent existing geographical research on cleantech from a relational economic 
geography perspective has focused on trying to understand the factors driving the growth 
and operations of sector and how far these can be regarded as distinctive from other 
branches of the financial sector.  These forays have produced some useful initial insights 
into how cleantech is being defined and how the looseness and dynamism of definitions of 
cleantech are furthering its legitimacy as an investment theme. For example, Caprotti 
(2012a) examines the various discursive logics emphasizing environmental crisis, resource 
efficiency and profitability that have contributed to the emergence of cleantech as a 
sectoral identity.  Masini and Menichetti (2012) and Wüstenhagen and Menichetti (2012), 
meanwhile, provide initial explorations into the behavioural factors affecting renewable 
energy investment.  Other studies have sought to define how geography affects cleantech 
venture investment by considering issues such as the importance of social clusters, access 
to capital and physical barriers to cleantech investment (Caprotti 2013; Knight 2010), or to 
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position cleantech as part of a broader evolution of the global technological-financial 
system, alongside other sectors such as biotech (Cooke 2008). 
 
However, this research has yet to provide a detailed picture of, firstly, how actors involved 
in the cleantech sector perceive the sector. Secondly, there is a need for investigation of the 
various factors, including but not limited to discursive logics, that have helped to 
consolidate cleantech as an investment target and continue to shape how cleantech 
networks form and day-to-day decision-making connects potential investors with 
prospective projects. This echoes earlier comments by Sidaway and Bryson (2002, p. 403) 
on the emergence of the ‘emerging markets’ investment category, focusing on the fact that 
‘despite research into money and ﬁnance... fund managers and analysts have been 
somewhat neglected’.  They note that this is a surprising and important omission in the 
analysis of money and finance and that geographers are well positioned to address.  
Equally, as with research into other areas of investment and finance, there is a need to 
balance the insights gained from relational economic geography research examining the 
social relations and processes contributing towards the operation of economic sectors or 
specific networks with those gained from analyzing the broader-level trends in investment 
(Torrance 2009). 
 
Accordingly, the central aim of this paper is to deepen understandings of the operation of 
cleantech investment by examining the decision-making processes of cleantech actors, how 
these are influenced by (and influence) cleantech investment networks, and the 
relationships between these factors and the macro-level drivers and discourses around the 
cleantech sector.  More specifically, a relational economic geography approach is used in 
conjunction with other frameworks (spanning the cultural, structural and actor-network 
dimensions of cleantech investment) to investigate: how actors within cleantech 
investment define the sector; the macro- and micro-levels drivers of cleantech investment 
activities; and how cleantech networks form and operate to create and disseminate 
cleantech discourses and to generate the mutual trust and information sharing needed to 
secure cleantech investments.  In so doing, the paper seeks to help shed greater lighter on 
the micro-level processes contributing to the creation and growth of cleantech investment 
markets as an essential catalyst and component of the green economy.    
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.  In the next section we explore the 
growth of research on finance within geography, focusing particularly on the contribution 
  
of relational economic geography and cultural economy approaches towards deepening 
understanding of the functional and spatial operation of finance markets, including 
cleantech.  Following this, we discuss the findings from 14 semi-structured interviews 
conducted between June and August 2012 with cleantech and venture capital investors and 
other professionals and companies operating in London-based cleantech investment 
networks.  London was selected as the focus of investigation because of its status as one of 
the world’s leading centres of cleantech investment, while respondents were selected based 
on their specialist knowledge of different sub-sectors within cleantech investment markets.  
The main themes explored in the interviews correspond with the major research questions 
identified above: firstly, respondents’ definitions of the cleantech sector; secondly, macro- 
and micro-drivers of cleantech investment; and thirdly, the inter-actor relations and 
networks perceived by respondents to aid the identification and completion of cleantech 
investments. The paper concludes by reflecting on the key insights gained from the study.  
 
Geographies of finance and cleantech 
Since the early 1990s, the geography of finance has grown from being a relatively neglected 
backwater of economic geography into ‘a vibrant intellectual terrain that is characterized 
by considerable variety in terms of theoretical approaches [and] substantive research 
concerns’ (Hall 2011, p. 234; Lee et al. 2009; Leyshon 1997; 1998).  A significant part of 
this interest has stemmed from the growing importance of financial markets to the 
functioning of politico-economic systems and their corresponding influence on other 
social, cultural and political geographies, a point underlined by the finance-led global 
economic downturn that began in the late 2000s (Wójcik 2009).  However, another 
contributor to the invigoration of geographical interest in the financial sector has been the 
growing diversity of perspectives used to probe the character and impacts of financial 
systems, in particular the supplementing of traditional political economy approaches 
focusing predominantly on analysing the uneven consequences produced by financial 
markets across different spatial and temporal scales (French et al. 2010; Pike 2006; Pike 
and Pollard 2010), with studies which are more culturally and socially informed in their 
examination of the relational geographies of finance. This emphasis has included 
investigations of how financial actors and intermediaries operate (both functionally and 
spatially) and how international financial systems are reproduced through the grounding 
of global financial flows in place-specific institutional spaces (Callon 2005; Clarke 2005; 
Hall 2011). 
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A core strand within geographical analyses of financial markets has centred on the spatial 
patterning of investment companies and their geographical links with firms seeking 
investment (Fritsch and Schilder 2008; Malmberg 2003; Mason and Harrison 2002; 
Saxenian and Savbel 2008). Studies on the spatial patterning of financial markets and how 
networks of capital and information operate within and across spatial scales in the global 
economy are by necessity intimately linked to analyses of the relational geographies of 
finance and investment in the sense that both of these research emphases seek to 
understand the factors linking capital to ‘productive activities’ (in the broadest sense of the 
term).  The key difference is the level of emphasis on contractual exchanges compared with 
the social processes involved in the creation of particular investment categories, the 
sharing of knowledge, expertise and resources, and the building of trust relationships. The 
latter focus falls most centrally within the research area of relational economic geography. 
This sub-field, in existence for almost three decades at the time of writing, is focused on 
the need to find a middle ground between economic theories that under-socialize economic 
behaviour and existing sociological frameworks that over-socialize such behaviour 
(Granovetter 1985). Relational economic geography is therefore centred on the ways in 
which socio-spatial relations of actors are intertwined with processes of economic changes 
at various geographical scales (Yeung 2005). Thus, when seen through a relational lens, 
economic rationality becomes more accurately viewed as embedded within social 
relationships (Boggs and Rantisi 2003).  
 
In turn, the individuals and network transactions which are part and parcel of these 
relationships are seen neither as mechanistic enactors of the logics of economic rationality 
and markets, nor as completely divorced from them. As Knox-Hayes (2009) observes in 
relation to the establishment of financial services for trading carbon emissions, new 
markets remain embedded within existing international financial markets and operate 
through virtual platforms, but still depend on underlying human networks that rely on 
‘social connectivity and proximity’ (p. 768) in which ‘trust and reciprocity is critical to all 
interactions’ (p. 762). Thus, studies sensitive to relational economic geography and of the 
embeddedness of social networks within the ‘economic’ all seek to correct reductionist 
thinking on economics (Callon 2005; Yeung 2005), which creates a rational entity (the 
‘economy’) to which ‘non-rational’ elements of non-economic life are subservient (Leyshon 
1998). These approaches simultaneously seek to avoid portraying the actors involved in 
financial networks as being divorced from the wider contexts of economic systems. 
Therefore, approaches informed by relational economic geography promote the study of 
  
financial actors, and of their interactions and the forms of association that enable 
interactions to take place, with an understanding of the interconnected nature of what 
have previously too often been described separately as the ‘economic’, the ‘cultural’, the 
‘political, and the ‘social’. In so doing, studies along these lines attempt to open out the 
empirical terrain of the ‘economic’ to recognize how the material realities of economic 
activities are embedded within social and cultural contexts (Gibson and Kong 2005; Amin 
and Thrift 2007; Hall 2011). It is at this juncture that we situate our analysis of cleantech 
as a relational sector within recent iterations of the ‘green economy’. 
 
As a relatively new sector in investment markets, cleantech remains an under-explored 
area of geographical research into financial markets compared with the attention paid to 
the creation and operation of other ‘environmental futures’ markets. Broadly, there has 
been much emphasis on environmental markets dealing with carbon (Bailey and Maresh 
2009; Bailey et al. 2011; Knox-Hayes 2009), as well as on markets focused on the 
commodification of a range of environmental goods and services, as is the case with 
wetland mitigation banking (Robertson 2004, 2006), and more marginal investment areas 
such as weather derivatives (Randalls 2010), in an attempt to conceptualise what has been 
termed the increasing financialisation of nature and the environment (Sullivan 2013) in 
neoliberal ‘efforts to fully integrate nature into the operation of capitalism’ (Knox-Hayes 
2010, p. 954). In this context, cleantech has rapidly become a major focus of financial 
markets focused on investments into environmental technologies and services. Indeed, by 
2008 the cleantech sector as a whole was valued at US$ 284 billion globally (Caprotti 
2010), a dramatic emergence of a sector which barely existed as recently as 2000. 
 
Cleantech is often framed as a technological, market-oriented and ecologically-
modernizing response to issues such as climate change and renewable energy because of 
its primary focus on developing and commercializing resource efficient and low-impact 
technologies and processes rather than galvanizing changes in social attitudes and 
behaviours (Wüstenhagen and Menichetti 2012).  However, defining what cleantech is and 
the areas of investment activity that fall into the cleantech category is far from 
straightforward.  The Cleantech Group (2012) suggests that: ‘Cleantech represents a 
diverse range of products, services, and processes, all intended to provide superior 
performance at lower costs, while greatly reducing or eliminating negative ecological 
impact’. However, the Foundation for Global Sustainability (2012) argues that: ‘Cleantech 
is not an “industry” limited to certain “sectors” … it is “eco-innovation” applied to all 
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industry sectors.’  Burtis et al. (2004, p. 6) nevertheless argue that: Cleantech companies 
‘share a common thread: they use new, innovative technology to create products and 
services that compete favorably on price and performance, while reducing mankind’s 
impact on the environment’. As such, cleantech products and services are often construed 
as a means of competing with existing technologies, with an economic rationale first and 
an environmental one second (Cooke 2008; Wüstenhagen and Menichetti 2012). 
 
Key to cleantech’s emergence as a sector and as an investment category is the idea of 
cleantech as a cultural economic ‘wrapper’ and as a ‘discursive logic’ that interprets 
technologies and material realities and structures them under the banner of cleantech as a 
sectoral identity.  Cleantech can thus be seen as ‘an organising trope focused on the nexus 
between technology, finance, innovation and future transition pathways’ (Caprotti 2012a, 
p. 371). However, the sector attracts substantial capital flows, and is therefore deeply active 
in the production of materialities, from renewable energy landscapes to new technologies 
of the everyday. The idea of a symbiotic relationship between discursive strategies and 
materialities in the creation of markets is a recurring theme in relational economic 
geography (Boeckler and Berndt 2012). Berndt and Boeckler (2009, p. 536), for instance, 
note the ‘self-realization of economic thought’ in their research into the sociology of 
markets. They argue that markets are performative in the sense that discursive logics and 
concepts shape actions in a way that makes them more than merely theoretical (see also 
Hudson 2004; Butler 2010).  The economic then takes on two incarnations: ‘the ‘chaotic’ 
(and immeasurable) sum of all economic activities and as a narrated, more or less 
coherent, subset of these activities; economic imaginaries, a coherent but selective 
representation of the complex social world’ (Van Heur 2010, p. 431). Cleantech discourses 
or narratives can thus be seen as central in shaping the material reality of the sector. 
 
In sum, previous research has made some progress in identifying the processes through 
which the cleantech concept is being delineated and the range of actors who have helped to 
mark out its discursive logics and identity as a technological revolution and a market-
driven response to climate and environmental trends. Beyond this, however, limited 
research has been conducted on how specific actors in cleantech investment define the 
sector, the factors informing the analysis of cleantech investments by investors and 
advisors, how cleantech networks form and operate, or how these factors are shaping the 
development, deployment and growth of clean technologies (Clark 2005). Considerable 
scope remains for research on cleantech investment that goes beyond the statistical 
  
analysis of investment deals and the mapping of investment patterns to probe how and 
why cleantech decisions are made and how the sector is developing.  This is because 
‘[m]arkets, and economic actors more widely, are not preformed and given, but are made 
up of the entwining of humans and a range of non-human actors such as technologies, 
theories, tools and beliefs’ (Hall 2011, p. 237). Such areas of research, we argue, are vital to 
understanding the green economy, not least because investment, in many ways, provides 
the crucial motive force for the emergence and commercialisation of new technologies 
upon which large segments of the green economy concept depends (Caprotti 2012b). At a 
basic cultural economic level, the logics behind the identification of cleantech as an 
attractive target for investment were based on actors’ definitions of cleantech, discussed in 
the following.  
 
Cleantech definitions and networks 
As our starting point in the analysis of the cleantech sector, we have opted to examine 
attempts to define the sector. Definitions proposed by our research participants show not 
only actors’ perceptions of cleantech, but also their conceptualisation of the sector’s 
attributes as an investment category. In part, some of the definitions we encountered 
reflected widely disseminated sectoral definitions published by actors central to the sector. 
An example of such a definition is the broad grasp of cleantech offered by Ron Pernick and 
Clint Wilder, two of the most active cultural and relational actors in cleantech since the 
inception of the sector. Indeed, Pernick was active in establishing CleanEdge Inc., the 
world’s first cleantech research and advisory corporation, in 2000; and Wilder, a 
renowned business journalist who specialises in high-tech industries. In 2007 they 
published The Clean Tech Revolution, a book focusing on the growth of cleantech, and 
which has since been translated into seven languages, thus showing its importance in the 
cultural importance of cleantech definitions. In the book, the authors defined the cleantech 
sector in the following way: 
 
‘Clean tech refers to any product, service, or process that delivers value using 
limited or zero nonrenewable resources and/or creates significantly less waste 
than conventional offerings.’ (Pernick and Wilder 2007, p.2). 
 
During the course of our research, it became clear that actors who followed a broader 
approach such as the one above frequently used more open definitions and felt no need to 
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name sub-sectors, but, importantly, highlighted a trend towards cleantech becoming 
‘omnipresent’: 
 
‘At [this company], we define it really broadly. We define it as any process that 
can be done more efficiently, and I think that’s the trend we’re going to see 
going forward. I think you will find cleantech being present in everything that 
we do.’ (Analyst, Cleantech Venture Capital Firm). 
 
However, actors who leaned towards more specific definitions sought to delineate the exact 
areas of cleantech. Even when they referred to the broad nature of cleantech, they were at 
pains to name sub-sectors: 
 
‘We’ve used the definition of cleantech put forward by Cleantech LLC out of 
California; which is really they are about 11 segments, of which five are about 
energy, a couple are about mobility, and then you’ve got agriculture and waste 
management as well. So it’s really anything that is making a baseline 
improvement on what we would call business as usual and that doesn’t just limit 
it to your renewable energy, which is where sometimes cleantech gets left. But 
it’s your green chemistry, it’s green buildings, its enzyme-based approaches, it’s 
substitutes for gold, copper, all of the scarce resources.’ (Senior Vice President 
Cleantech, Energy & Sustainability, PR & Communications Consultancy). 
 
Some participants even rejected the possibility of defining a cleantech sector. This was 
justified in a number of ways, from arguments about of cleantech companies being too 
diverse, to the choice for better-established identities for existing, specific sub-sectors: 
 
‘Well it doesn’t mean much for me at all. I see it as an artificial label, imposed on 
a diverse bag of investments and I don’t really understand why it’s useful. So 
I’ve never really subscribed to cleantech as an idea.’ (Director, Renewable 
Project Finance Firm). 
 
Nonetheless, some of the participants who rejected the idea of cleantech as a technology 
sector employed a more nuanced definition of the sector as an investment ‘theme’ instead. 
This focus emphasizes the role of cleantech as a cultural construction in making sense of 
variegated environmental markets and in attracting flows of capital and investment as a 
  
result of broader trends focused on the establishment and emergence of the green 
economy across a range of scalar and national contexts: 
 
‘Cleantech is not a sector, it’s an investment theme. So I think that the thing that 
defines cleantech is that it’s a response to certain mega-trends.’ (Senior Analyst, 
Market Research Firm). 
 
Thus, one notable aspect of these definitions is that cleantech can be defined as a reaction 
to green economy concerns, especially around issues such as the improvement of 
economic-environmental efficiency. This can be seen as the core definitional justification 
of the sector, and is one reason why salient actors argue that it is appropriate to use ‘clean’ 
rather than ‘enviro’ or ‘green’ as it distances cleantech from emotive and non-profit-driven 
responses that can be generated by identification with environmental, ‘eco’ or ‘green’ 
definitions. As the Cleantech Group (2012) argues: 
 
‘While greentech, or envirotech, has represented ‘end-of-pipe’ technology of the 
past (for instance,  smokestack scrubbers) with limited opportunity for 
attractive returns, cleantech addresses the roots of ecological problems with new 
science, emphasizing natural approaches such as biomimicry and biology. 
Greentech has traditionally only represented small, regulatory-driven markets. 
Cleantech is driven by productivity-based purchasing, and therefore enjoys 
broader market economics, with greater financial upside and sustainability.’ 
 
Above all, cleantech was defined and discussed by a range of research participants as an 
investment target which ‘made sense’ not because of the potential environmental benefits 
of any particular cleantech technology or industrial process, but because of the potential 
for returns and for market-making, the latter based on a range of policy and other drivers 
which were in some cases couched in ‘environmental’ or ‘green economy’ justifications. As 
one participant noted, her clients were not ‘tree huggers’, but did want to differentiate 
themselves from other firms; they liked to be identified as cleantech as it meant being 
taken seriously as a business proposition, for securing investment, which would be less 
likely if they were to brand themselves as ‘green’, ‘eco’ or ‘environmental’ (Managing 
Director, Communications Consultancy). Moreover, as a financial analyst for renewables 
project finance noted, 
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‘What I’ve learnt […] so far in finance, is that the environment isn’t ever, ever 
brought up really. No one particularly cares. I mean, I’m sure people are happy to 
be working in a sector that’s not doing bad, to some extent helping the 
environment. But even myself, when I get into work, I don’t try and shoot down 
investments or projects which I don’t think are environmentally sound enough, 
it’s all a question of business, at that point.’ (Financial Analyst, Project Finance 
Firm). 
 
 
Whether cleantech is conceptualized as a definition that can solely be applied to a fixed set 
of sub-sectors or as a discursive logic that permeates a wider range of sectors, there is 
certainly a difference in how actors in each area of cleantech act and interact in the 
networks through which financial markets take shape. Moreover, cleantech was noted by a 
number of participants as having widened into newer sub-sectors, which are notable for 
being less capital intensive than the ‘traditional’ areas of cleantech, such as renewable 
power generation. Indeed, the participants quoted above were working with a range of 
different markets, technologies, customers, challenges and business models. However at 
the same time they were responding to the same macro trends and drivers. Therefore, from 
the definitions offered by participants, it can be said that cleantech is a ‘discursive sphere’, 
or an investment ‘theme’, but there is less certainty that it is an actual industrial sector. 
This appears to be true when considering the various sub-sectors that make up cleantech, 
because they do not target the same markets, or share the same suppliers or corporations, 
and the range of business models are frequently very different. However, it is also clear 
that there are strong enough cultural and discursive linkages and overlaps between these 
various areas to enable actors to consider them to be logically encompassed within loose 
definitions under the banner of ‘cleantech’: 
 
‘Who is the word cleantech valid for? It’s certainly valid for people who run 
events, and for investors who want to put some kind of label on all these kinds of 
sectors, it’s a sort of filtering name at the moment, which I think over time will 
fall away as the sub-sectors become more developed.’ (Partner, Corporate 
Finance Firm). 
 
  
There are, however, moments when different networks of actors around different types of 
investment or different technologies and sectors coalesce around particular companies and 
deals. In this way cleantech does exist as a space that is broader than the (currently) 
relatively fragmented sub-sectors that make it up. Thus, various elements (both human 
and non-human) can come together at different moments in both space and time, only to 
change later in shifting socio-technical and environmental-economic assemblages 
(Anderson and McFarlane 2011; Allen and Cochrane 2007; Cowen and Smith 2009; Law 
1992). This captures the complex and often unstable way in which different types of 
finance and technologies coalesce through the alignment of cultural and economic drivers 
and actors in moments of cleantech investment activity, only to shift as companies seek 
different forms of investment, investors look at deals in other sub-sectors, advisors are 
brought in, or new companies and sub-sectors enter the cleantech sphere. The geography 
of cleantech is therefore complex, but an identification of the shifting nature of 
associations enables an understanding of how such conceptual geographies (for example, 
sectoral definitions or specific investment deals made possible through the cultural 
economy of cleantech) come into existence, endures over time and changes. In turn, the 
conceptual geographies of sectoral definition are based on relational interactions between 
actors, and on day-to-day decision-making at the level of individual actors, whether these 
are seen as individuals or corporations. It is to these relational networks that the paper 
now turns. 
 
Relationality, networks and decision-making 
Cleantech is constructed through the way in which it is defined and performed, as argued 
above. Interpersonal networks and relations are therefore a key component in attempting 
to analyse cleantech as an economic, cultural and social construct (Sunley 2008). In our 
analysis, networks and relations constitute a frame of reference through which the object 
of our study can be scrutinised (Latour’s 2005). Having examined the relationship between 
the emergence of cleantech and some of its broad definitional trends and strategies, it is 
important to ask how these discursive, definitional strategies influence the day-to-day 
decision-making of investors as actors within cleantech networks seen as a ‘hybrid 
entanglement’ (Amin and Thrift 2007, p. 143) by considering the power of cultural 
mechanisms such as values, soft knowledge, trust and cultural metaphors, as well as by 
analysing the flows of material inputs and outputs such as raw materials, technologies and 
funding. 
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In a number of interviews there was an evident disconnection between identified macro-
level drivers of cleantech and the factors influencing investment decision-making on an 
operational level.  The latter were seen as virtually indistinguishable from any other 
investment analysis: 
 
‘The measures that are applied to cleantech are pretty much the same as the 
economic measures that are applied to any other sector. I would say that it's nice 
to have the additional PR for the companies. Cleantech is not a social 
entrepreneurial endeavour, it’s just measured on cost savings or marginal 
improvements, just as any other sector and I think that’s key to understanding it; 
ultimately, investments are only made if the numbers make sense.’ (Head of 
Environmental Finance, Professional Services Firm). 
 
This was also reflected in a distancing of cleantech investment from investment strategies 
that promote ethical choices, or equal weighting for environmental evaluation. Several 
interviewees assured us that cleantech companies were assessed on how efficiently (and 
profitably) they delivered technology-based improvements and ameliorations: 
 
‘They are certainly not foregoing profitability for ethical soundness, they are 
simply looking for businesses that make lots of money, and do good as well, in 
that order. And that’s the right way to do it. And there’s lots of ways to make 
money, where the result is clean streets, or less polluted air.’ (Partner, Corporate 
Finance Firm). 
 
It would be easy to conclude from such a line of argument that cleantech actors adopted a 
more or less ‘business-as-usual’ operating ethos; this would raise pertinent questions 
about ‘greenwash’ within the sector. However, this would be an oversimplification of the 
networked and relational realities within which investors and cleantech executives have to 
both define and identify cleantech and its macro drivers, and take operational decisions 
which are ultimately related to financial performance and an investment’s future profit 
potential. This co-constitution of macro drivers, definitions and everyday financial and 
material practices constitute the shifting assemblage of cleantech, as discussed above.  
 
Relationships between actors are of central importance to this co-constitution, and to the 
way cleantech business is carried out between a wide range of actors, such as venture 
  
capital investors looking to profit through selling on their investee companies to potential 
buyers, to corporate finance advisors aiding cleantech innovators in attracting funding, a 
communications consultancy helping a cleantech company to get its message heard by the 
right people, or a legal firm advising a cleantech investor on mergers and acquisitions 
(M&A) procedures. Numerous benefits were identified by our interviewees in thinking 
about cleantech investments relationally: actors were keen to maintain close relationships 
and dense networks of interest. In part, this was because intimate knowledge of the 
investment landscape and of the firms and individuals active within that landscape was 
seen as crucial to the establishment of successful investment deals and working 
relationships. Furthermore, the importance of networks was highlighted through reference 
to the enabling of access to contacts, venture partners and expertise in individual 
industries and sectors.  Networks were also described as essential and central to the 
operation of specific investment assemblages. For venture and equity investors, for 
example, networks enabled co-investing. In turn, co-investment networks were seen as 
desirable not only because of the investment opportunities they presented, but because of 
the potential for reducing risk to individual investment firms when co-investments were 
made with other investment partners. With other firms going through due diligence 
processes, the chances of investing in a potentially risky investment are reduced:  
 
‘I think the industry is quite co-operative and I think that makes more sense for 
the investment community. As often in cleantech, because it’s a bit of a risky 
sector, many funds prefer to co-invest.’ (Head of Environmental Finance, 
Professional Services Firm).  
 
Furthermore, the more different parties within cleantech work with each other, the better 
the understanding they build up of what the other is looking for from a particular deal. As 
those bonds grow stronger, trust is built up, it speeds up the deal process, and interactions 
between the two actors are likely to be more successful. As one interviewee commented: 
 
‘That actually quite surprised me when I started, I always thought it was like 
stock markets where it’s all anonymous, but it’s not, you work on a personal level 
with everyone. We know one group at a bank that just do infrastructure and 
renewables, and we work with them every week, and that’s good because we then 
just send them our projects, and within an hour they say ‘yeah we like this, we’ll 
take this’, or ‘no, we don’t like this’. (Financial Analyst, Project Finance Firm). 
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Building on this, the scale and breadth of networks highlighted by our participants focused 
on the dense, intimate nature of these networks. For example, in discussing the search for 
potential investors for renewable energy projects, the same participant quoted above 
stated that: ‘we only talk to around 15-20 investors, ever. If that helps give a scale to it, and 
that’s enough to satisfy our appetite’ (Financial Analyst, Project Finance Firm). This gives 
some indication of the scale of the relational actor network within which a single project 
finance firm was seen as operating:  
 
‘Well, there are only a limited number of investors and we probably know most of 
them. We met them by getting out there. But now we know where they are, we 
can speed up the investment process for anybody who is looking for investment. 
A lot of people will still go to the events and try to do it that way and a lot of 
people get stuck in the valley of death; now how connected are the two? As one 
person famously said to me, you have to eat a lot of chicken wings to find any 
money out there!’ (Partner, Corporate Finance Firm). 
 
Therefore, actors were deeply cognisant of the necessity for networks which were not only 
intimate, but effective in sharing risk, building trust, identifying drivers and investment 
opportunities, and facilitating the opportunities for interaction. This was seen as 
particularly important by actors working in an advisory capacity: 
 
‘The key is to have a network in the sector of the potential investors and buyers, 
et cetera. So it’s more around what do you know of the network within a sector, 
than if you know all of the different technology differences between battery A and 
battery B. So it’s important that you know all of the players.’ (Head of 
Environmental Finance, Professional Services Firm). 
 
Building up networks can also provide investors with access to expert knowledge to help 
better assess potential investments. This is particular important in an area like cleantech, 
which covers such a broad range of different sub-sectors that frequently have different 
business models, different technologies, and which is also particularly fast-paced, because 
it is relatively young. For example, it is important to understand the difference between 
different polymers used in wind turbine blade construction even at the prototype stage, as 
it may critically affect how an investment will perform. This may differ greatly from the 
  
challenges presented, for example, in assessing an investment in an energy efficiency 
software company, or a water filtration company. Investment firms aimed to build up their 
expertise regarding specific cleantech sub-sectors. As one participant noted: 
 
‘We have a really great venture partner network. And they are ex-industry guys; 
so we’re pretty confident through our network that we can get to the right person 
to give us feedback on a particular opportunity. Surrounding yourself with those 
kinds of people is pretty important.’ (Analyst, Venture Capital Firm). 
 
As well as technical expertise and expert knowledge, the role of professional service firms 
was seen as central to the functioning of investment networks in the cleantech sector. As 
noted by previous studies (Wray 2012; Mason and Harrison 2002), this is especially true of 
venture capital and private equity, where investors often take an active and face-to-face 
role in assisting the management of the company. Several research participants identified 
the key role of service and advisory firms in mediating relational connections between 
actors in heterogeneous networks: 
 
‘We get our message out there to corporate finance houses, law firms, because 
that helps deal flow. You need to engage with companies and watch them grow, 
you need to surround yourself with people who have experience. And of course, 
the most important aspect is deal flow; you don’t get access to the deals unless 
you do.’ (Analyst, Venture Capital Firm). 
 
Finally, relationships in the cleantech space can be seen as identity-forming. It is through 
engaging with other actors in cleantech networks that individuals and companies develop 
their reputation and identity within the cleantech sector. This is significant because this is 
a key way in which the legitimacy is established. Through building associations with other 
actors, engaging in repeated relations of transactions and exchange, a cleantech firm 
strengthens its own status and the discursive logics that contribute to its identity. 
Moreover, the act of collaborating or advising strengthens the ties between actors, in a way 
that will enable them to improve the way in which they do business in the future. It is 
however important to note that cleantech is a fast-moving, dynamic economic 
environment with new companies and new sectors emerging and evolving, so these ties 
within actor-networks do not serve to entrench or stagnate cleantech, but to allow 
companies and individuals to work together in efficient ways that are mutually beneficial 
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and open to rapid change and adaptation. Repeated interactions (building embedded 
relations) act as a conduit to resources that may not otherwise be accessible (Uzzi 1999).  It 
can be seen that there is a cultural and social context surrounding the financial activity of 
cleantech created through events, meetings, understanding of synergistic and shared goals, 
and trust built up through business track records. The challenges of cleantech, as it often 
involves companies that face significant technology as well as market risk, mean that co-
investment is important as it increases the amount of due diligence undertaken, and it 
allows investors access to a wide geographical scope of expertise and support for 
companies to help them enter new markets, for example.  
 
Overall, participants identified the importance of networks of contacts for co-investing, 
obtaining technical expertise for assessing companies, and finance and legal expertise to 
speed up deal flow. However, as several scholars of relational economic geography and the 
cultural economy have argued, there is a need to balance the benefits of adopting 
culturally-nuanced theoretical frameworks with appropriate consideration of the 
‘embeddedness’ of networks of actors within cultural, political, territorial and institutional 
contexts (James 2005, in Sunley 2008, p.10). It is therefore important to balance the 
significance of relations, connections, and networking with the influence of identified 
drivers and macro-trends, and prevailing economic conditions, whilst not narrowing the 
focus of the “relational” element of the analysis too much. 
 
What this means in the scope of this study is that while it may be true that cleantech 
investors are not thinking about saving the planet every time they walk into the office, it is 
not possible to completely separate day-to-day operational decision-making from extra-
organisational drivers and macro-trends. Indeed, we argue that cultural practices of 
relationality and network-building intersect with broader economic, policy and other 
drivers in co-constituting cleantech as a sector and investment direction. As one of our 
respondents stated: 
 
‘At the company level, the ones doing the most in this are doing it for one of two 
reasons; either they believe that it is the way they will deliver sustainable value in 
the future, so they look at their consumers who are becoming more alert to these 
issues, and looking for a way to build reputation, to lock on the consumer to their 
brand long-term. Or they’re doing it because their board sat down and has done 
serious risk assessment of what climate change means for us, and they are trying 
  
to reduce their exposure long-term to cost spikes which are going to come when 
resources really do get scarce.’ (Senior Vice President Cleantech, Energy & 
Sustainability, PR & Communications Consultancy) 
 
More broadly, it is also true that although cleantech venture capital and private equity 
actors respond to these macro drivers, due to its relative size as an economic sector, 
cleantech is not in a position to set agendas. It can, however, play a vital role in developing 
innovative solutions to broader issues seen as drivers, and it is in this context that 
discursive constructions of cleantech intersect with technological and economic 
materialities.  
 
Concluding remarks 
The broad range of processes that characterise the emergence of new economic identities 
and sectors have been largely implicit in existing research and have often been left within 
the wider ‘black box’ of wider socio-economic change, understood as taking place as a 
matter of course. Indeed, such processes have, in many cases, been regarded as 
constrained to a single dimension (economic, technological, political and so on) where 
change can be seen to be taking place, and their deeper complexities and multifaceted 
nature have not always been rigorously investigated. It is in this context that the 
theoretical frameworks offered by relational economic geography and by studies into the 
cultural economy offer assistance in understanding the complex, shifting, and sometimes 
elusive and contested character and workings of phenomena within economic geographies 
such as sectoral emergence and change (Bathelt and Glückler 2003; Bosco 2006; Gibson 
and Kong 2005). 
 
Through our analysis of relationality and of the perceptions of specific investment actors 
within the cleantech sector in London, we have highlighted the relationships and co-
constitution of micro and macro-level drivers and specific contexts contributing to the 
advancement of cleantech as a sector and investment theme. What has emerged in 
particular from our research is the importance of relational networks of investment and 
cognate actors in establishing and performing the identities of specific sectors of the 
economy, according to shifting and evolving cultural-economic logics. A key corollary of 
this is the assumption that can be made about economic trajectories in specific sectors. 
Specifically, this paper has opened up the potential of identifying relational, cultural 
change processes through which actors’ agency is expressed: the implication of this is that 
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the ‘economic’ sphere is, at any point in time, ‘up for grabs’ and open to endogenous or 
exogenous influences. This connects to wider, contemporary concerns about the extent to 
which transitional environmental-economic strategies can be designed and enacted in the 
construction of green economic futures and trajectories. 
 
This paper has focused on the pivotal role of relational networks of actors in performing, 
enabling and contesting sectoral identities and processes of emergence. Networks allow 
cleantech actors to understand the market drivers and the decision-making logics of 
potential investors, technology firms, and buyers. All of the above factors help to create 
identities and relations of trust, give legitimacy to cleantech discourses and generate the 
essential conditions for mutually beneficial economic activity. The study has developed our 
understanding by establishing how those actors who are active participants define 
cleantech, and what factors influence its development. It is thus key for further research to 
focus not just on networks and highly visible actors within relational networks, but also on 
the broader range of discursive actors who may not be directly involved in investment 
decision-making but who, through their discursive and network influences, may exert 
subtler but still significant impacts on sectoral emergence. These actors may include 
professional service firms such as market research corporations, law and advisory firms, 
financial journalists, sectoral media coverage and financial news outlets, and other parts of 
relational networks which can be investigated in the online sphere through forums and 
blogs, and through online investment platforms. In this context, the cultural economic 
network which plays a part in sectoral emergence can be seen as comprised of an extensive 
and diverse range of actors that includes, but is certainly not limited to, investment and 
industry executives. As mentioned above, this also leaves open the possibility of 
investigating the targeted involvement of other actors or relational mechanisms within 
existing and evolving networks in attempts to influence green economy development 
trajectories.  
 
This study thus highlights the importance of focusing on economic networks, and their 
roles, scale and composition in enabling the development and workings of an emergent 
sector such as cleantech. Our research has underlined the importance of networks not 
simply in terms of their emergent and evolving nature. Rather, our focus on the cleantech 
sector has uncovered the central importance of relational networks for those same actors 
who are part of the network: in this light, the network can be seen not as a simple 
expression of economic organization and cultural economic activity, but as the central 
  
interface through which actors can achieve specific goals and in so doing, perform the 
emergence of a sector which encompasses but surpasses the firm-specific or individual 
economic identity of any one actor. The implications for research in economic geography 
are multiple, as it opens up the possibility of interdisciplinary links with other social 
science approaches which have tackled the question of the formation and functioning of 
social networks and their broader role in both enabling and shaping social life. 
 
Finally, our study reveals cleantech’s predominant framing as a neo-liberal, market-driven 
sector that provides tangible expression of broader trends towards ‘market 
environmentalism’ (Bailey 2007; Bakker 2005) as a currently hegemonic development 
pathway towards a ‘green economy’. Indeed, the development of the sector can be seen to 
be operationalized across a variety of scales, from the individual investor decision-making 
scale, to broader policy drivers at a national or even global scale. These multi-scalar drivers 
operate on a scalar spectrum which ranges from corporate sustainability strategies, to 
institutional investors’ influence on sectoral development, to governmental regulatory 
incentives or directional policies, to global concerns around decarbonisation and the 
establishment of an as-yet loosely defined ‘green economy’. However, it is clear that central 
to an understanding of the emergence of cleantech is an understanding of how networks, 
relationality and multi-scalar drivers interact in the co-constitution of economic sectors 
driven by environmental finance. In this sense, the paper concludes with two related 
points. The first is that neoliberal market environmentalism is, without question, the 
dominant discourse within relational networks performing the emergence of new sectors 
of the green economy, such as cleantech. The second is that our focus on the importance of 
networks and relationality depicts a more diffuse distribution of agency than is perhaps 
commonly allowed for in discussions of the development and dominance of neoliberal 
market environmentalism. This second point is particularly important because if key 
aspects of the green economy are relational and performed rather than prescribed and 
prefigured, they are also open to change. 
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